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OIL AND GAS: THE IMPLIED COVENANT FOR REASONABLE DEVELOP-
MENT INCLUDES A DUTY TO USE SECONDARY RECOVERY METH-
ODS UNDER THE PROPER CIRCUMSTANCES. Waseco Chemical &
Supply Co. v. Bayou State Oil Corp., 371 So. 2d 305 (La. Ct. App.
1979).
I. INTRODUCTION
The ever-evolving oil and gas lease has long been a source of con-
troversy, as evidenced by the voluminous works on the subject.'
Among the topics which have attracted attention are the implied cove-
nants2 created by the oil and gas lease.3 Prominent among the implied
covenants is what is most often termed the covenant for reasonable de-
velopment.4 While the law of the development covenant has been
years in the making, at least one important question had, until recently,
1. Eg., E. BROWN, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS LEASES (2d ed. 1979); S. GLASSMIRE, LAW
OF OIL AND GAS LEASES AND ROYALTIES (2d ed. 1959); Ashabranner, Oil and Gas Lease Royalty
Clause-One-Eighth of What?, 20 ROCKY MT. M.L. INST. 163 (1975); Note, Construing the Long
Definite Term Lease: Gulf Oil Corp. v. Southland Royalty Co., 25 BAYLOR L. REV. 683 (1973);
Note, Oil and Gas Leases--the Habendum Clause Determines the Duration of the Lease Unless
Properly Modofled by Other Provisions of the Lease, 5 TEX. TECH L. REV. 900 (1974); Note, Oil and
Gas." Lease Extension, 3 TULSA L. J. 65 (1966).
2. There has been some disagreement among the writers as to whether the covenants are
implied in law or implied in fact. Professor A.W. Walker, Jr. believes they are implied in fact.
Walker, The Nature of the Property Interests Created by an Oil and Gas Lease in Texas, 11 TEx. L.
REv. 399, 402-06 (1933). Professor Maurice Merill, on the other hand, believes that they are
implied in law. M. MERRILL, THE LAW RELATING TO COVENANTS IMPLIED IN OIL AND GAS
LEASES §§ 7, 220 (2d ed. 1940 & Supp. 1964). According to Professors Howard Williams and
Charles Meyers, courts have held wherever it has mattered that the covenants are implied in fact.
H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, 5 OIL AND GAS LAW § 803 (1978). The only real importance in this
distinction is that covenants implied in fact may be disclaimed by specific provisions in the lease.
3. M. MERRILL, THE LAW RELATING TO COVENANTS IMPLIED IN OIL AND GAS LEASES (2d
ed. 1940 & Supp. 1964); H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, 5 OIL AND GAS LAW (1978); Boone, Implied
Covenantfor Additional Development, 31 MIss. L.J. 34 (1959); Martin, Modern Look at Implied
Covenants to Explore, Develop andMarket Under Mineral Leases, 27 OIL & GAS INST. 177 (1976);
Meyers, The Implied Covenant of Further Exploration, 34 TEX. L. REV. 553 (1956); Williams, Im-
plied Covenantsfor Development and Exploration in Oil and Gas Leases-the Determination ofProf-
itabiliy, 27 KAN. L. REV. 443 (1979).
4. The implied covenant for reasonable development has been referred to by various names.
Among them are the following. The implied covenant to proceed with reasonable diligence. Ez-
zell v. Oil Assoc., Inc., 180 Ark. 802, 22 S.W.2d 1015, 1018 (1930). The implied covenant to
develop with reasonable diligence. State e rel Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Worden, 44 N.M. 400,
., 103 P.2d 124, 126 (1940); Walker, The Nature of the Property Interests Created by an Oil and
Gas Lease in Texas, 11 TEx. L. REV. 399, 401 (1932). The implied covenant to conduct additional
development after paying production is obtained. E. BROWN, 2 LAW OF OIL AND GAS LEASES
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remained unanswered: Does the lessee's duty to develop reasonably
extend to the use of secondary recovery methods?5
Recently, in Waseco Chemical & Supply Co. v. Bayou State Oil
Corp. ,6 a major shift occurred in defining the lessee's duty under this
covenant. This shift answered affirmatively the question posited above.
This note will briefly examine the evolution of the covenant for reason-
able development and identify its basic principles. An examination of
the Waseco decision will then be undertaken with an analysis of its
implications for the future.
II. EVOLUTION OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT FOR REASONABLE
DEVELOPMENT
The implied covenant for reasonable development has long been
recognized in the typical oil and gas lease.7 According to Professors
§ 16.02 (1973). The implied covenant to fully develop. Id at 16-17 n.33 (citing Berry v. Wondra,
173 Kan. 273, 246 P.2d 282 (1952)).
Under any name, the implied covenant for reasonable development is now universally recog-
nized in the typical oil and gas lease. H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, 5 OIL AND GAS LAW 212.1-57
(1978).
5. After the pressure within an oil and gas formation has been dissipated, production will
decrease substantially or cease entirely. This decrease in pressure and production occurs before
all of the oil in place has been recovered. As used herein, "secondary recovery" refers to any of a
number of specialized techniques used to extract the remaining oil.
Broadly defined, [secondary recovery] includes all methods of oil extraction in
which energy sources extrinsic to the reservoir are utilized in the extraction. . . . The
term is usually defined somewhat more narrowly as a method of recovery of hydrocar-
bons in which part of the energy employed to move the hydrocarbons through the reser-
voir is applied from extraneous sources by the injection of liquids or gases into the
reservoir. Typically a differentiation is made between secondary recovery and pressure
maintenance; the former involves an application of fluid injection when a reservoir is
approaching or has reached the exhaustion of natural energy, while the latter involves an
application of fluid injection early in the productive life of a reservoir when there has
been little or no loss of natural reservoir energy. The fluid (water, gas or air) is injected
into the formation through an input well and oil is removed from surrounding wells,
H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS 532 (4th ed. 1976).
In most oil reservoirs, natural energy for production can be supplemented to bring
about increased oil recovery by injection of either gas or water into the reservoir. If such
injection takes place while the reservoir pressures are still high and most of the wells still
flowing, the operation is classified aspressure maintenance. If it is started after pressures
have been substantially depleated and the field is in general pumping or stripper stage, it
is classified as secondary recovery, repressuring, or water-jiooding.
ENGINEERING COMM. OF THE INTERSTATE OIL COMPACT COMMISSION, OIL AND GAS PRODUC-
TION 50 (1951).
See STANDING SUBCOMM. ON SECONDARY RECOVERY METHODS, DIVISION OF PRODUCTION
OF THE AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, SECONDARY RECOVERY OF OIL IN THE UNITED
STATES (2d ed. 1950); H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, I OIL AND GAS LAW § 104 (1978).
6. 371 So. 2d 305 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied 374 So. 2d 656 (La. Sup. Ct. 1979).
7. The covenant was actually recognized as long ago as 1897 in Harris v. Ohio Oil Co., 57
Ohio St. 118, 48 N.E. 502 (1897).
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Williams and Meyers,8 and the leading case, Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc
Co.,9 the lessee's obligation under the development covenant arises
only after production. The covenant requires that the lessee perform
such development activities as the reasonably prudent operator would
undertake considering the interests of both the lessor and the lessee.10
The origin of the implied covenant for reasonable development, as
producing jurisidctions know it today, is found in the common law ac-
tion of abandonment." A number of lessors brought successful suits
for partial cancellation relying on legal fiction and an action for aban-
donment as their basis of recovery. 2 These cases were open to serious
8. H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 832 (abr. ed. 1975).
9. 140 F. 801 (8th Cir. 1905).
10. The lessee's obligation is "upon securing production of oil or gas from the leasehold...
to drill such additional wells to develop the premises as a reasonably prudent operator, bearing in
mind the interests of both lessor and lessee, would drill under similar circumstances." H. WIL-
LIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 832, at 507 (abr. ed. 1975).
"Whatever, in the circumstances, would be reasonably expected of operators of ordinary pru-
dence, having regard to the interests of both lessor and lessee, is what is required." 140 F. at 814.
The same or a substantially similar standard has been recognized in every important producing
jurisdiction. U.S. v. City of Pawhuska, 502 F.2d 821 (10th Cir. 1974) (Oklahoma); Gregg v.
Harper-Turner Oil Co., 199 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1952) (Oklahoma); Brixey v. Union Oil Co., 283 F.
Supp. 353 (W.D. Ark. 1968); Clayton v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 150 F. Supp. 9 (D.N.M. 1957); Ezzell v.
Oil Assocs., 180 Ark. 802, 22 S.W.2d 1015 (1930); Hartman Ranch Co. v. Associated Oil Co., 10
Cal. 2d 232, 73 P.2d 1163 (1937); Mountain States Oil Corp. v. Sandoval, 109 Colo. 401, 125 P.2d
964 (1942); Carter Oil Co. v. Dees, 340 Ill. App. 449, 92 N.E.2d 519 (1950); Sanders v. Birming-
ham, 214 Kan. 769, 522 P.2d 959 (1974); Myers v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 153 Kan. 287, 110 P.2d
810 (1941); McMahan v. Boggess, 302 S.W.2d 592 (Ky. 1957); Caddo Oil & Mining Co. v. Produ-
cers' Oil Co., 134 La. 701, 64 So. 684 (1914); Compton v. Fisher-McCall, Inc., 298 Mich. 648, 299
N.W. 750 (1941); Southwest Gas Producing Co. v. Seale, 191 So. 2d 115 (Miss. 1966); Fey v. A.A.
Oil Corp., 129 Mont. 300, 285 P.2d 578 (1955); Libby v. De Baca, 51 N.M. 95, 179 P.2d 263 (1947);
Hermon Hanson Oil Syndicate v. Bentz, 77 N.D. 20, 40 N.W.2d 304 (1949); Harris v. Ohio Oil
Co., 57 Ohio St. 118, 48 N.E. 502 (1897); Spiller v. Massey & Moore, 406 P.2d 467 (Okla. 1965);
North Am. Petroleum Co. v. Knight, 321 P.2d 964 (Okla. 1958); Ramsey Petroleum Corp. v.
Davis, 184 Okla. 155, 85 P.2d 427 (1938); Wilcox v. Ryndak, 174 Okla. 24, 49 P.2d 733 (1935);
Clifton v. Koontz, 160 Tex. 82, 325 S.W.2d 684 (1959); Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Co. v. Barker, 117
Tex. 418, 6 S.W.2d 1031 (1928). See E. BROWN, 2 LAW OF OIL AND GAS LEASES at 16-49 (1976);
H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, 5 OIL & GAS LAW § 806.3 (1978).
11. While Brewster recognized the implied covenant for reasonable development in 1905,
many courts, particularly those in the major producing states, were unwilling to recognize the
existence of the covenant, relying instead on common law abandonment and legal fictions. See
notes 12-15 infra and accompanying text.
Abandonment has been defined as the intent to relinquish a property interest forever, coupled
with physical acts evidencing that intent. Both elements are required to state a cause of action.
See Capital Transit Co. v. Hazen, 93 F.2d 250 (D.C. Cir. 1937); Cohn v. San Pedro, L.A. & S.L.R.
Co., 103 Cal. App. 496, 284 P. 1051 (1930); Ullman ex rel Eramo v. Payne, 127 Conn. 239, 16
A.2d 286 (1940); Stinnett v. Kinslow, 238 Ky. 812,38 S.W.2d 920 (1931); Jackson v. Steinberg, 200
P.2d 376 (Or. 1948); Boatman v. Andre, 44 Wyo. 352, 12 P.2d 370 (1932).
Simply a failure to use is not sufficient to establish abandonment. Barnett v. Dickinson, 93
Md. 258, 48 A. 838 (1901); Welsh v. Taylor, 134 N.Y. 450, 31 N.E. 896, 2 N.Y.S. 815 (1892);
Phillips v. Gross, 32 S.D. 438, 143 N.W. 373 (1913).
12. One such case is Hodges v. Mud Branch Oil & Gas Co., 270 Ky. 206, 109 S.W.2d 576
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question, however, because the required elements of physical relin-
quishment of the leases and an intent to abandon were absent and
often contrary to the uncontradicted evidence. Many courts and writ-
ers were concerned with the inappropriateness of this theory of recov-
ery and in response, the implied covenant for reasonable development
was recognized as the proper theory of recovery in Doss Oil Royally Co.
v. Texas Co. 13
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma began its opinion in Doss with a
careful review of the confused line of precedent which had granted re-
covery on the theory of abandonment in some cases and in some cases
on no theory at all.14 The court reasoned that prior Oklahoma deci-
sions granting relief on the theory of abandonment 15 were correctly de-
cided but for the wrong reasons. The court concluded that the implied
covenant for reasonable development was the proper theory of recov-
ery and adopted a reasonably prudent operator standard similar to the
one set out in Brewster.
16
After Brewster7 had recognized the covenant for reasonable de-
velopment and the standard to be followed, and Doss had clarified its
(1937), in which a well was drilled on a 70 acre lease in 1932. In 1935, following demand by the
lessor, the lessee refused to engage in further development. The lessor brought an action for
abandonment and the court accepted his argument, cancelling the lease on all the leasehold except
the land immediately surrounding the one producing well. See also Ezzell v. Oil Assocs., 180 Ark.
802, 22 S.W.2d 1015 (1930); Mills v. Hartz, 77 Kan. 218, 94 P. 142 (1908); Wing v. Edwards, 175
Okla. 642,54 P.2d 351 (1936); Newman v. Replogle, 139 Okla. 86, 281 P. 272 (1929); Highfield Co.
v. Kirk, 248 Pa. 19, 93 A. 815 (1915); Parish Fork Oil Co. v. Bridgewater Gas Co., 51 W. Va. 583,
42 S.E. 655 (1902); Pryor Mountain Oil & Gas Co. v. Cross, 31 Wyo. 9, 222 P. 570 (1924).
13. 192 Okla. 359, 137 P.2d 934 (1943). The Doss controversy involved two leases. On one, a
40 acre lease, five wells were drilled, between 1920 and 1922, in the east 20 acres and one in the
northwest corner of the west 20 acres. No wells were drilled from May, 1922 until suit was filed in
October, 1938. On the second lease, containing 100 acres, 10 producing wells were drilled in 1921
and 1922. There was additional activity on the lease in 1923 and 1924, but no other drilling until
1938. Doss Oil Royalty Co. fied suit for cancellation of the lease on the undeveloped portions
thereof, basing its action on a theory of abandonment.
14. See, e.g., Severson v. Barstow, 103 Mont. 526, 63 P.2d 1022 (1936).
15. See, e.g., Wing v. Edwards, 175 Okla. 642, 54 P.2d 351 (1936); Newman v. Replogle, 139
Okla. 86, 281 P. 272 (1929).
16. We have conclusively presumed the intent to abandon from failure to drill for an
unreasonable length of time. This doctrine of abandonment is simply a legal fiction used
to arrive at an equitable result....
... We think the rights heretofore granted under the theory of abandonment
should be granted under the true doctrine of breach of the implied covenant to fully
develop .... The prudent operator rule may be considered as a measuring stick to
guide the court in determining the diligence required of the lessee in order to ascertain
whether a breach of the implied covenants has occurred.
Doss Oil Royalty Co. v. Texas Co., 192 Okla. 359, 363, 137 P.2d 934, 938 (1943).
17. 140 F. 801 (8th Cir. 1905).
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applicability, the covenant became well entrenched in American oil
and gas law.
Extending the lessee's duty under the development covenant to
secondary recovery methods is reasonable. The standard of the reason-
ably prudent operator"8 dictates that the lessee must undertake any
drilling activity which the prudent operator would undertake. When
the desired continued development would be profitable and in the best
interests of both lessor and lessee, such development should be re-
quired of the lessee regardless of whether it requires primary or secon-
dary recovery. There is no difficulty, under the proper circumstances,
in extending this theory to the use of secondary recovery methods. In
the past, however, courts have refused to take this step.' 9
The reasons for the courts' failure to extend the development cove-
nant are difficult to pinpoint. The recency of secondary recovery meth-
ods has made it difficult for lessors to prove that such activities would
be profitable and feasible.2 0 This has, in large part, contributed to the
courts' unwillingness to grant relief when there has been a failure to
engage in secondary recovery. Despite the lack of an authoritative an-
swer2' on the subject, a number of commentators and courts predicted
that the duty to reasonably develop would be extended to secondary
recovery methods.22
18. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
19. Many cases explicitly refuse to recognize such a duty. See, e.g., Wolfson Oil Co. v. Gill,
309 P.2d 282 (Okla. 1957) (holding that the particular facts present did not warrant a finding that
the lessee had a duty to engage in secondary recovery); Morrison v. Johnson, 199 Okla. 264, 185
P.2d 208 (1947).
20. NATIONAL ENERGY LAW AND POLICY INSTITUTE, UNIVERSITY OF TULSA COLLEGE OF
LAW, LEGAL ASPECTS OF ENHANCED OIL RECOVERY 37 (1977).
21. While the cases interpreting the duty to use secondary recovery are few there is ample
case law examining the lessee's right to use secondary recovery. Ramsey v. Carter Oil Co., 74 F.
Supp. 481 (E.D. Ill. 1947), aft'd, 172 F.2d 622 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 958, rehearing
denied, 338 U.S. 842 (1949); Carter Oil Co. v. Dees, 340 IU. App. 449, 92 N.E.2d 519 (1950); Wiser
Oil Co. v. Conley, 346 S.W.2d 718 (Ky. 1960). See H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, 1 OIL AND GAS
LAWV § 218.5 (1978).
22. H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 935 (abr. ed. 1975); LEGAL ASPECT OF
ENHANCED OIL RECOVERY, supra note 20, at 37 (1977); Merrill, Implied Covenants and Secondary
Recovery, 4 OKLA. L. REV. 177 (1951); Walker, Problems Incident to the Acquisition, Use and
Disposal of Repressuring Substances Used in Secondary Recovery Operations, 6 ROCKY MT. MIN.
L. INST. 273 (1961). The following "hints" that this extension of the covenant might be proper
have appeared in the case law. "There is respectable authority to the effect that there is an implied
covenant in oil and gas leases that a lessee should resort to a secondary recovery method shown to
be practical and presumably profitable as a means of getting additional return from the lease." In
re Shailer's Estate, 266 P.2d 613, 616-17 (Okla. 1954). "[T]he Lessee not only had a right, but had
a duty, to waterflood the premises for the recovery of oil for the benefit of the mineral owners
should it be determined by a prudent operator to be profitable." Tidewater Oil Co. v. Penix, 223
F. Supp. 215, 217 (E.D. Okla. 1963). There is an "implied right, and even a duty, for a reasonably
1980]
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Another area of controversy concerning the development covenant
is the remedy to be provided the lessor upon the lessee's breach of that
covenant. It, like the standard used to define the lessee's duty, has been
the center of many legal disputes.
Because the implied covenant for reasonable development has its
roots in equity,"3 the common and logically acceptable remedies for
breach of the covenant include: 4 1) cancellation of the lease on all but
the producing property; 5 2) conditional cancellation unless the lessee
begins new development operations;2 6 and 3) damages.27 While there
prudent operator to adopt a repressuring system for the secondary recovery of oil." Reed v. Texas
Co., 22 Ill. App. 2d 131, 136, 159 N.E.2d 641, 644 (1959). See Ramsey v. Carter Oil Co., 74 F.
Supp. 481 (E.D. Ill. 1947); Carter Oil Co. v. Dees, 340 I11. App. 449, 92 N.E.2d 519 (1950).
23. Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Romero, 194 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1952), is a good example of
how courts have emphasized equitable considerations. In modifying a trial court order, the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated, "It cannot be too often or too clearly stated that a decree in
a situation of this kind must be equitable to both lessee and lessor." Id at 386. The court went on
to grant conditional cancellation on currently nonproducing portions of the lease.
24. "Various courts have recognized three separate remedies for breach of the covenant of
reasonable development: (I) Outright cancellation, except for a small area surrounding existing,
producing wells; (2) the more moderate conditional decree of cancellation, unless a specified
number of wells are drilled within a fixed period of time, and (3) damages." Southwest Gas
Producing Co. v. Seale, 191 So. 2d 115, 122 (Miss. 1966).
25. Hull v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 119 F.2d 123 (5th Cir. 1941); Amerada Petroleum Co. v.
Doering, 93 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1937); McMahan v. Boggess, 302 S.W.2d 592 (Ky. 1957); Hodges v.
Mud Branch Oil & Gas Co., 270 Ky. 206, 109 S.W.2d 576 (1937); Vetter v. Morrow, 361 So. 2d
898 (La. Ct. App. 1978); Vickers v. Vining, 452 P.2d 798 (Okla. 1969); Wolfson Oil Co. v. Gill, 309
P.2d 282 (Okla. 1957); Doss Oil Royalty Co. v. Texas Co., 192 Okla. 359, 137 P.2d 934 (1943);
Amerada Petroleum Co. v. Sledge, 151 Okla. 160, 3 P.2d 167 (1931).
26. Saunder v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 292 U.S. 272, rehearing denied, 292 U.S. 613
(1934); Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Romero, 194 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1952); Hull v. Magnolia Petro-
leum Co., 119 F.2d 123 (5th Cir.), rev'dper curiam on other grounds, 314 U.S. 575 (1941); Amerada
Petroleum Co. v. Doering, 93 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1937); Elliot v. Pure Oil Co., 10 I11. 2d 146, 139
N.E.2d 295 (1956); Rush v. King Oil Co., 220 Kan. 616, 556 P.2d 431 (1976); Shaw v. Henry, 216
Kan. 96, 531 P.2d 128 (1975); Vonfeldt v. Hanes, 196 Kan. 719, 414 P.2d 7 (1966); Stamper v.
Jones, Shelborne, & Farmer, 188 Kan. 626, 364 P.2d 972 (1961); Temple v. Continental Oil Co.,
182 Kan. 213, 320 P.2d 1039, on rehearing, 183 Kan. 411, 328 P.2d 358 (1958); Berry v. Wondra,
173 Kan. 273, 246 P.2d 282 (1952); Gregory v. Sohio Petroleum Co., 261 S.W.2d 623 (Ky. 1953);
Vickers v. Vining, 452 P.2d 798 (Okla. 1969); Perkins v. Mitchell, 153 Tex. 368, 268 S.W.2d 907
(1954).
27. The lessor is generally allowed to recover lost royalties, but required to pay the lessee the
royalties again when the oil and gas are actually produced. Daughetee v. Ohio Oil Co., 263 111.
518, 105 N.E. 308 (1914); Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Co. v. Barker, 117 Tex. 418, 6 S.W.2d 1031
(1928). There is; however, a minority ofjurisdictions that gives the lessee credit for damages paid
as royalties become due on actual production. Cotiga Dev. Co. v. United Fuel Gas Co., 147 W.
Va. 484, 128 S.E.2d 626 (1962).
There is some authority that an award of damages is the only appropriate remedy unless the
legal remedy is inadequate. Daughetee v. Ohio Oil Co., 263 111. 518, 105 N.E. 308 (1914); Hower-
ton v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 81 Kan. 553, 106 P. 47, rev'don othergrounds, 82 Kan. 367, 108 P.
813 (1910); Harris v. Ohio Oil Co., 57 Ohio St. 118, 48 N.E. 502 (1897); Waggoner Estate v. Sigler
Oil Co., 118 Tex. 509, 19 S.W.2d 27 (1929); Cristie, Mitchell & Mitchell Co. v. Howell, 359 S.W.2d
658 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962). There are also a number of older cases holding that damages is the
only appropriate remedy. Vendocia Oil & Gas Co. v. Robinson, 71 Ohio St. 302, 73 N.E. 222
6
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 15 [1979], Iss. 3, Art. 10
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol15/iss3/10
19801 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
is some authority otherwise,"8 oil and gas writers agree that these are
the typical and only logical remedies. a9
Thus, the oil and gas lessee had no duty under the develoment
covenant to engage in secondary recovery. A breach of the develop-
ment covenant typically resulted in partial cancellation of the lease,
conditional cancellation of the lease, or damages. These rules were
firmly established until last year's landmark decision in Waseco.
III. WASECO CHEMICAL & SUPPLY Co. V BAYou STATE OIL
CORp.30
A. The Unique Factual Setting
The lease in question in Waseco covered eighty acres in the Bel-
levue field located near Shreveport, Louisiana. Production in the 900
acre field is from the Nacatoch sand." The oil from the reservoir
under the Bellevue field, first produced in significant quantities in 1963,
is a heavy, asphaltic, high viscosity crude.3z Prior to 1963 large quanti-
ties of water were produced with the oil through the use of stripper
wells.33
Bayou State acquired the Scanland lease in the early fifties. At
that time there were about fifty wells, most of which were producing,
(1905); McKnight v. Manufacturers Natural Gas Co., 146 Pa. 185, 23 A. 164 (1892); Cole Petro-
leum Co. v. United States Gas & Oil Co., 121 Tex. 59, 41 S.W.2d 414 (1931); McGraw Oil & Gas
Co. v. Kennedy, 65 W. Va. 595, 64 S.E. 1027 (1909).
28. Collins v. Mt. Pleasant Oil & Gas Co., 85 Kan. 483, 118 P. 54 (1911); Grass v. Big Creek
Dev. Co., 75 W. Va. 719, 84 S.E. 750 (1915).
29. See E. BROWN, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS LEASES § 16.03 (2d ed. 1979); H. WILLIAMS &
C. MEYERS, 5 OIL AND GAS LAW § 834 (1978).
30. 371 So. 2d 305 (La. Ct. App. 1979).
31. Detailed technical descriptions of current operations in the Bellevue field are set out in
FireoodMore Than Half Way to Production Goal, OIL & GAS J., June 4, 1979, at 66. That article
makes reference to a more detailed report, #SAN/I 189-2, available from the Department of En-
ergy, Energy Technology Center, Bartlesville, Oklahoma.
32. One method of describing the consistency of a given type of oil is to measure its specific
gravity or relative density. Commonly, specific gravity is expressed as the ratio of the weight of a
volume of oil to the weight of the same volume of water. These measurements are typically taken
at 600 fahrenheit, and the resulting measurement is called 60/600 relative density.
Another measurement of specific gravity is API degrees. This measurement is calculated as
follows: API degrees equals 141.5 divided by 60/60* relative density minus 131.5. Using these
calculations, the oil in the Bellevue field has been measured at 19'API. This is roughly the same
consistency as honey. See AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, I MANUAL OF PETROLEUM MEA-
SUREMENT STANDARDS 1-2 (1977); P. HOBSON, INDUSTRIAL LUBRICATION PRACTICE 4-6 to 4-7
(1955).
33. The federal government defines a stripper well as one that has an average daily produc-
tion of 10 barrels per day or less during a 12 month period starting after December 1, 1972. 10
C.F.R. § 212.54(c) (1979).
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on the eighty acre tract. Average production in 1955 was forty-six bar-
rels per day. In the ensuing twenty-four years, the lessee, Bayou State,
made no capital expenditures on the lease and drilled no wells. In the
same period, production declined to six barrels per day and the number
of producing wells declined to nine.34 In reviewing Bayou State's activ-
ities, the court declared, "When judged even by 1950 standards, Bayou
State's production operations on the Scanland lease [are] derelict, anti-
quated, cheap and inefficient." 35  This statement reflects a seemingly
unwarranted prejudice against Bayou State, possibly explaining the de-
cision's more unusual aspects.36
The problem in Waseco is attributable to Bayou State's compara-
tive lack of activity in the Bellevue field. While Bayou State's produc-
tion was decreasing dramatically, production on neighboring leases was
increasing because of the use of a relatively new method of secondary
recovery-fireflooding or in situ combustion.37 Fireflooding had been
used by nearby operators on other leases. 38 The opinion relies strongly
on statistics to show the reasonableness of implementing fireflooding
techniques in the Bellevue field.39 The court also properly emphasized
that Bayou State itself had used fireflooding in this same field on an-
34. The court states, with apparent opprobrium, that Bayou State reported to Louisiana au-
thorities that production was taken from 10 wells, while in 1976, it was admitted that production
was actually from only nine wells. The court's emphasis on this rather minor error seems mis-
placed. 371 So. 2d at 311.
35. Id The court supports this statement by citing Bayou's failure to drill on the lease, its
methods of gauging, measuring, securing, and commingling the oil sold, and some questions ex-
pressed by the lower court concerning whether production was in paying quantities.
36. See notes 47-48 infra and accompanying text. That this is the first opinion to recognize a
duty to engage in secondary recovery methods makes the decision additionally unusual. While
some may say this unusual expression of prejudice reduces the precedential value of the decision,
the fact that various authors have predicted such a development, see note 22 Supra, and the inher-
ently appealing logic of the extension, saves at least some of the opinion's value.
Some may even argue that the case was not decided on a failure to engage in secondary
recovery, but rather a failure to develop reasonably from the outset. The remainder of the opinion
makes clear, however, that the basis of the remedy granted was Bayou State's failure to fireflood
rather than its "derelict, antiquated, cheap and inefficient" operations judged by 1950 standards.
371 So. 2d at 311.
37. There are various methods of fireflooding. In each, an igniting material is lowered into
the bore hole. The hydrocarbons in the reservoir are ignited and the resulting heat and steam
reduce the viscosity of the oil and force it toward the well. See B. BERGER & K. ANDERSON,
MODERN PETROLEUM, A BASIC PRIMER OF THE INDUSTRY 157-60 (1978); INTERSTATE OIL COM-
PACT COMMISSION, SECONDARY AND TERTIARY OIL RECOVERY PROCESSES (1974); LEGAL As-
PECTS OF ENHANCED OIL RECOVERY, supra note 20, at 17-19 (1977); NATIONAL PETROLEUM
COUNCIL, ENHANCED OIL RECOVERY (1976).
38. The Getty-Lodwick Lumber lease, the Getty-Elston lease, the Cities Service-Bodcau
leases, the Getty-Buckelew lease, and to a much smaller extent on the Bayou State-Wyche lease.
39. The first fireflood project by Getty on 2.8 acres increased production from about four to
about 100 barrels per day in only 18 months.
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other lease. While this project was not as successful as others in the
field, it did make operations profitable. Among the most important sta-
tistics was that the royalty owners where fireflooding was used received
more than $1200 per acre per month while royalty owners in a field
with stripper wells received less than $3 per acre per month. Also of
primary importance was that the lease in question was nearly identical
to those surrounding it.40
B. Applying the Reasonably Prudent Operator Standard to Secondary
Recovery
After considering the facts noted above, the court reached the fol-
lowing conclusion: "While technically called a technique of secondary
recovery, fireflooding is, as to the type of the Bellevue residuary oil, as
the trial court emphasized, the 'only method of producing the Bellevue
field and has been for a number of years. . . the normal [and] efficient
method. .. .' "4 This being the only feasible method of production
on this lease, the court concluded that the lessee, by failing to utilize
this method of recovery, had breached its duty to reasonably develop.4'
To determine the reasonableness of the lessee's operations, the
Waseco court adopted the factors first set out in Vetter v. Morrow.
4 3
These factors are:
(1) geological data; (2) number and location of the wells
drilled both on leased lands and adjoining property; (3) pro-
ductive capacity of producing wells; (4) costs of drilling oper-
ations as compared with profits; (5) time interval between
completion of the last well and the demand for additional op-
erations; and (6) acreage involved in the disputed
lease. .... 44
40. The court found that the oil below this lease is the same heavy, low viscosity crude below
the other leases in the field. The sand thickness below the Scanland lease is said to be conducive
to fireflooding. The Scanland lease comprises 10% of the productive capacity of the field and
contains about 3,000,000 barrels of oil still in place. 371 So. 2d at 311-12.
41. Id at 312 (quoting the opinion of Cecil C. Lowe, J., Twenty-Sixth Judicial District Court,
Parish of Bosier, State of Louisiana).
42. The formulation of the lessee's duty in Louisiana is found in LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 31:122 (West 1975). "A mineral lessee is. . .bound. . . to develop and operate the property
leased as a reasonably prudent operator for the mutual benefit of himself and his lessor." See
Vetter v. Morrow, 361 So. 2d 898, 899 (La. Ct. App. 1978). While statutorily based, this statement
of the reasonably prudent operator standard is nearly identical to the common law statement. See
notes 8-10 supra and accompanying text.
43. 361 So. 2d 898 (La. Ct. App. 1978).
44. 371 So. 2d at 307, 312; 361 So. 2d at 900.
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Without specifically stating how each of these factors were met, the
Waseco court stated,
Applying these factors to the circumstances of this case as
found by the lower court, which we add, are fully supported
by the record, compels our concluding, as did the lower court,
that Bayou State failed in its obligation of diligent develop-
ment of the Scanland lease for the benefit of itself and the
lessors.45
Thus, without considering the many concerns associated with
fireflooding and secondary recovery in general,46 the court extended the
implied covenant for reasonable development to include secondary re-
covery methods.
C. The Unusual Remedy
The unique remedy granted by the Waseco court is of great impor-
tance. As previously noted47 the typical and only reasonable remedies
for breach of the development covenant are cancellation on all but the
producing areas of the lease, conditional cancellation, and damages.
These remedies sufficiently protect the lessor's interest and provide him
with precisely what he is entitled to, while maintaing production and
avoiding economic waste.
Notwithstanding this, the Waseco court granted immediate and
unconditional cancellation of the entire lease. Such a remedy is novel
in a case involving a breach of the development covenant,48 but more
important, such a remedy is inappropriate. The result unduly penalizes
lessees. The lessee, who has been producing in paying quantities for
many years, loses an entire lease, including producing wells, with no
chance to redeem himself. Damages would sufficiently redress any
hardship visited upon the lessor as a result of the lessee's careless oper-
ation. This makes clear the punitive nature of the Waseco court's ques-
tionable remedy. Equally undesirable is the removal of this leasehold
from production in a time when each barrel of oil increases in value
and importance daily.49 While the theory of recovery relied on in
45. 371 So. 2d at 307.
46. The high initial capital investment required, the technique's experimental nature, the de-
creasing use of fireflooding in the past five years, and the general difficulty of proving profitability.
47. Notes 24-29 supra and accompanying text.
48. Such a remedy has, however, been granted for a breach of the offset covenant-the im-
plied covenant to protect from drainage. H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, 5 OIL AND GAS LAW § 825
(1978).
49. If, as the lessor argues, this is still a valuable lease, one would expect that a new lessee
[Vol. 15:597
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Waseco is sound, the remedy granted is questionable.
IV. THE FUTURE OF WASECO
A. The Sign'fcance of the Lessee's Extended Duty
While many will criticize the decision in Waseco, it is theoretically
sound and extremely important to both owners and producers. The
court's apparent prejudice against Bayou State" and its failure to con-
sider the uncertainties connected with secondary recovery methods5"
will prompt many to criticize the opinion and discount its precedential
value. One must be careful, however, not to overlook the importance
of Waseco. The Waseco decision established a long awaited and much
needed revision in oil and gas jurisprudence. It is only reasonable that
the duty of the lessee to develop 2 extend to secondary recovery meth-
ods when such would be the course of action of the reasonably prudent
operator. The facts of the Waseco case 3 present circumstances in
which fireflooding would be a course of action followed by the reason-
ably prudent operator. In this limited respect, the Waseco decision is
both valuable and correct.
Waseco's theory of recovery is a valid and important precedent.
The remedy granted in Waseco, unconditional, immediate, and total
cancellation, however, is inappropriate and logically unsound. Its pu-
nitive nature is unnecessary and unlikely to be accepted in other juris-
dictions.
B. Limitations on Waseco's Precedential Value
Despite the decision's value, it will likely be limited in several im-
portant respects. The unique facts of the case make future factual dis-
would be found shortly. There are, however, a variety of factors mitigating against immediate
continuation of production. The former lessee must be given a reasonable time to remove his
equipment. It will take a new lessee a substantial amount of time to obtain equipment and em-
ployees and begin operations. Most important, however, is the likelihood of speculation. With
the rising price of oil, a speculative holding of valuable oil producing property is increasingly
likely. Such speculative holding not only removes the lease from production, lowering domestic
output, but also creates a potential for a disastrous cumulative effect resulting in increased energy
prices.
50. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
51. See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
52. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
53. The most important factors, and those most likely to form the basis for further applica-
tion of Waseco, are: (1) great success on surrounding leases with secondary recovery, (2) compar-
atively poor production using conventional primary recovery techniques on the lease in question,
(3) physical conditions on the particular lease conducive to secondary recovery, and (4) financial
benefit to the lessors of nearby leases on which secondary recovery is being used.
1980]
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tinctions probable. The use of in situ combustion as a secondary
recovery method is declining.54 There is reason to believe that this de-
cline will continue." The declining use suggests that the occurrence of
facts substantially similar to those in Waseco will be unlikely. Without
successful, established fireflooding projects in other fields, the prece-
dential value of Waseco will likely be diminished.
The Waseco decision was largely based on the activities of Getty
Oil Corp. in the Bellevue field. Several factors make Getty's actions
unique and suggest that their repetition is unlikely. The Getty opera-
tion has been described as the nation's "pacesetter." 56 This description
indicates the unique nature of the factors present in Waseco. The tech-
nology available to Getty is, according to Professor Martin, largely un-
available to other prudent operators due to its high degree of
confidentiality. This not only exhibits the uniqueness of the Getty pro-
ject, but illustrates its marginal use as a guide for future drilling opera-
tions. The court also relied, in part, on other successful operations in
the Bellevue field. These successful projects may also be discounted. A
recent report indicates that the Department of Energy is underwriting a
sizable portion of the developing company's cost because of the experi-
mental nature of many of its operations 7.5  This outside financial assist-
ance lends credence to the speculation that fireflooding requires a
prohibitively high initial investment,58 and reinforces thoughts that a
similar project will be difficult if not impossible to duplicate. The
unique character of the Bellevue field is significant in that a fact situa-
54. The number of active in situ combustion projects in the United States dropped from 38 in
1970 to 21 in 1975. Noran, Production Report, Enhanced Reco'ery, Acion is Worldwide, OIL &
GAS J., April 5, 1976, at 107.
55. In situ combustion is a method of recovery hampered by substantial physical limitations.
The following barriers to further utilization have been recognized: (I) use of the method requires
a prohibitively large initial investment; (2) operation of the entire reservoir is required for effective
use; (3) the method creates extensive adverse air emissions; (4) close control of the operation is
required, (5) unusually high heat emissions are created; (6) extremely high sound emissions ac-
company production; (7) additional land-use is necessary; (8) there are high occupational hazards
due to potentially toxic or explosive concentrations of gas. LEGAL ASPECTS OF ENHANCED OIL
RECOVERY, supra note 20, at 18-19 (1977).
56. Noran, Produuc/ion Report, EnhancedRecoveryAcion is Worldwide, OIL & GAS J., April
5, 1976, at 107, 119 (1976).
57. The Getty-Bodcau fireflood project has an estimated budget of $8.2 million, of which the
Department of Energy will fund a maximum of $3.1 million or about 38%. In the first two years
of the project, $3.6 million were spent, of which $1.05 million were provided by the Department of
Energy. This project has been labeled as a test project. Fireflood More Than Hafway to Produc-
/ion Goal, OIL & GAS J., June 4, 1979, at 66.
58. See note 55 supra.
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tion substantially similar to Waseco is unlikely to occur in the near
future. This may severely limit the opinion's precedential value.
V. CONCLUSION
The decision in Waseco Chemical & Supply Co. v. Bayou State Oil
Corp. is significant. It is the first to extend the oil and gas lessee's duty
to reasonably develop to the use of unconventional secondary recovery
methods. This extension was developed by applying the traditional
standard of the reasonably prudent operator. Although logically ap-
pealing, the Waseco decision is subject to several substantial limita-
tions. Foremost is the unique factual setting of the decision. As lessors
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